



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
716 SICARD STREET SE SUITE 2000
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20388-5380

5720 F03-0276
SEROOLJF/4U1016

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

The processing of the 17 pages of documents referred by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command pertaining to your request for information regarding the Poland Intelligence Service has been partially completed. All releasable information is provided at enclosure (1), along with an explanation of exemptions taken under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).

As the official responsible for the partial denial of your request, I am advising you of your right to appeal this determination. Your appeal must be postmarked within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. An appeal should be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy's designee: Office of the Judge Advocate General, (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue, S.E., Suite 300, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 20374-5066. The envelope and letter should bear the annotation "FOIA Appeal".

Pages numbered 4-10 and 16-17 are currently going through a classification security review in another office within this Service. We will correspond with you further upon the conclusion of that review.

Falling below the automatic fee-waiver threshold, fees in this case have been waived.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JL Jones", is written over a horizontal line.

JASON L. JONES
LTCJ, USN

Encl:
(1) Documents

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. §552):

- (b)(1) protects from disclosure national security information concerning the national defense or foreign policy;
- (b)(2) related solely to internal personnel rules and practices, the release of which would allow circumvention of a statute or rule;
- (b)(3) specifically exempt from disclosure by statute;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a private source which would cause substantial competitive harm to the source;
- (b)(5) pre-decisional opinions and recommendations, inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that show foreseeable harm if released. Also, attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product are covered;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical information, the release of which would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) investigatory records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, which (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, (E) would disclose investigative techniques, and/or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

PRIVACY ACT (5 U.S.C. §552a):

- (b) applies to information concerning other individuals which may not be released without their written consent;
- (j)(2) (A) applies to information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting only of identifying data, (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual, or (C), reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws;
- (k)(1) applies to information and material properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (k)(5) applies to investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal, civilian employment, or access to classified information, release of which would disclose a confidential source; and
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service, the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process.

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GID 65-0461

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232-S-55

April 1955

30 May 1955

COMNAVGER APO 742

Frankfurt 53-1

B-6

West Germany/ Contact House for Polish Agents in Hamburg.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

A restaurant in HAMBURG allegedly controlled by a "U.S. Agency" is operated as a contact house between Polish merchant marine sailors and an American Intelligence Agency. Operations in the restaurant are allegedly handled awkwardly and are observed by Polish counter-intelligence agents which subsequently results in the arrests of any sailors who have frequented subject restaurant.

1. According to information received from various HAMBURG sub-sources the GASTAETTE KOEPLIN there is allegedly a restaurant being operated as a cover for a US intelligence agency. The proprietor is ostensibly a Bulgarian named [REDACTED] spots Polish Merchant Marine sailors who visit his restaurant and phones to an alleged US agency. Shortly after his call a few men arrive in a light tan BORG-WARD ISABELLA bearing the liscence H 41 22 53. These men approach the Poles and try to carry on conversations with them. All of the guests of the restaurant recognize the men as US officials or officers. As the restaurant is also frequented by Polish counter-intelligence agents, sailors seen talking to the "Americans" are reported to GDYNIA where they are arrested upon their return. 18 cases of such arrests have ocured renently. These cases were charged with smuggling of watches and cigarettes as well as with espionage.

2. The activity of the "Americans" involved is so awkward and evident

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COMNAVGER IO DIST LIST I; ALUSNA WARSAW.

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Declassified/Downgrade to
Auth. OPNAVINST 5513.16
Date 08JUN04 By 00LSE

Encl 2

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CONNAVGER APO 742

232-S-55

30 May

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

that it seems that they are actually trying to expose the Polish sailors. One of the worst of these "U.S." contact men, probably not an American himself is ~~REDACTED~~ (fnu). **b7c**

3. The Polish counter-intelligence agents do excellent work. Source in HAMBURG claim the Polish security police in GDYNIA have a complete report on every crew members activities before the arrival of every ship in GDYNIA. While the ship is still at sea, radio operators transmit details to the U.B. in the home port. HAMBURG is crowded with these agents of the U.B.

4. The situation is rendered more difficult by the competition between the various western intelligence services (English, French, U.S. and German). Rivalry between the various agencies (even the different U.S. agencies are competing each other) leads to a preposterous situation: nobody really knows who works for whom and against whom. The agents of the other side profit by this situation as they work as a well-organized group within this chaos.

5. HAMBURG friends of source feel that current mass-arrests of western resident-agents, especially of the English and U.S. secret services, in POLAND demonstrate the following thesis: the West proceeds with little organization, little professional ability, little knowledge of Polish counter-espionage methods, and with too little money. Unless western intelligence in Hamburg is reorganized it may happen that no information other than well-prepared false material will be forthcoming. At present, a new type of information dealing is developing in HAMBURG. These people sell information to all agencies simultaneously. Most of the information is false. Knowing exactly what is wanted the information dealers can produce the material.

6. The following case has become known among HAMBURG friends of source: A Polish sailor after having jumped ship at STOCKHOLM lived well for nearly 2 years by selling his allegedly valuable information to the following agencies:

- a. Radio Free Europe at STOCKHOLM
- b. Swedish intelligence; then he fled to BELGIUM
- c. Belgian intelligence; then he fled to the NETHERLANDS
- d. Dutch intelligence; then he fled to HAMBURG
- e. U.S. intelligence (probably U.S. Navy), at HAMBURG
- f. U.S. C.I.C. (probably), at HAMBURG *NO - NO C.I.C. ONI, in France*
- g. French intelligence, at HAMBURG
- h. British intelligence. *HAMBURG*

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This individual reported on items on which he actually could not have been knowledgeable. He was eventually unmasked and was found out as one who had escaped from POLAND in 1949 and had been involved in a bank robbery in SWEDEN.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
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Source Information: As indicated.

Preparing Officer's Comment: It is impossible to evaluate such information. It is planned to investigate the situation in concert with the BREMEN HAVEN office of this command. It is possible that Polish U.B. agents are acting as "Americans" in the subject case to trap Polish sailors.

Prepared:

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Forwarded:

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NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Page(s) 4-10
withheld entirely at this location. One or more of following explain this deletion.

☐ Deleted under exemption(s) _____

☐ Documents originated with other government agency(ies). Referred for review and direct response to you.

☐ Pages contain information furnished by other government agency(ies). We will advise you of releasability of information following consultation with agency(ies).

Comments: Under Security Classification Review

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

85 274 655

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MEMORANDUM for The Director of Central Intelligence
Attn: Deputy Director for Plans

Subj: Polish Security Measures at Stettin and Swinemunde (U)

Encl: (1) Copy DIO-3ND ltr ser 02798/92E3 of 26 May 1965, same subj

1. Enclosure (1), which contains information with respect to security procedures in the Polish seaports of Stettin (Szczecin) and Swinemunde (Swinoujscie), is forwarded for information as a matter of interest.

2. Counterintelligence records of the Office of Naval Intelligence contain no additional data identifiable with either [REDACTED] (DPOB: [REDACTED] or her brother, [REDACTED] reportedly an Engineering Officer aboard the S.S. MORMACVEGA.

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W. H. CLARK
Commander, USNR
Assistant for Counterintelligence Programs

Copy to: (w/encl)
DIA
FBI
OSI
ACSI (Army)
USCG (OIN)

CRF FILE COPY

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28 JAN 99

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Reg no. 77605 92
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT
FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING
P.O. BOX 413
80 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10007

TELEPHONE RECTOR 2-6100

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3800/5/DPB:la
Ser 02798/92E3

26 MAY 1965

From: Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, THIRD Naval District
To: Director of Naval Intelligence

Subj: Reported Polish Security Measures at Stettin and Swinemunde (U)

Encl: (1) Identifying Data on [REDACTED] dtd 25 May 1965

1. The following information, furnished by Joseph R. DAVIS, Master of the S.S. MORMACVEGA (AM), is forwarded as a matter of interest and for any action deemed appropriate.

a. The S.S. MORMACVEGA owned and operated by MOORE-McCORMACK LINES INC. of New York, sailed New York on 16 April 1965 for several Northern European ports including Antwerp (22 April), Rotterdam (28 April), Gothenburg (30 April), Oslo (2 May), Copenhagen (5 May) and Stettin (7 May). On the return voyage the ship called at Antwerp (10 May), Rotterdam (12 May), and arrived at New York on 19 May 1965. For purposes of this trip, none of the personnel aboard the S.S. MORMACVEGA had prior contact with this office.

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b. On the morning of 7 May 1965, the S.S. MORMACVEGA (AM), entered the Swina River, Poland. Immediately upon arrival at the Parnica Quay, Stettin (approx. 5 hours after entering the mouth of Swina at Swinemunde) two men, attired in civilian clothing, came aboard the vessel. They proceeded to the Master's cabin, stated that they were Immigrations Officials, and advised that they would like to inspect the passports of the passengers and review the crew list. Based upon their accent the Master was of the opinion that one visitor was Polish, while the other was Russian. When the Master asked for the passports, the aforementioned individuals stated that they would return them personally to the passengers. Since this was an unusual procedure, the Master asked if there was anything wrong. They assured him everything was in order and then started contacting the passengers. After returning four of the five passports, the men entered the stateroom of [REDACTED] a passenger who is identified in enclosure (1). They remained in the room with the door closed and after approximately 30 minutes, they left and escorted [REDACTED] to the ship's lounge, where they continued to interview her. The Master noted that [REDACTED] appeared to be upset. During the conversation in the lounge, she and one of the men got up and went to her room. When they returned several minutes later, the man was carrying, what the Master identified as [REDACTED] camera (35 mm type with telephoto lens) and several rolls of film. The two men then brought the camera and film to the Master and stated that they intended to take these items along with [REDACTED] into the city. When

ENCLOSURE (1) TO DNI LTR SER 433/P92 d 2nd 1965

EXEMPTED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
FOR AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652

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3800/5/DPB:ja
Ser 02793/92E3
26 MAY 1965

the Master asked what the problem was, they stated that [redacted] had photographed the Naval facilities at Swinemunde, and that this was prohibited. [redacted] then stated that she would not leave the ship and that she felt ill. According to the Master, the men apparently accepting [redacted] statement, departed the ship without her, but took the film and cameras.

c. [redacted] account, as related by the Master, is as follows. Two men came into her cabin while she was in the bathroom. When she stepped out of the bathroom, the two men were standing in the room and the door had been closed. They then proceeded to ask her such questions as where she worked, where she lived, what her parents did for a living, etc. Not knowing how to react, [redacted] reportedly answered all of the questions to the best of her ability. They asked her if she had taken any photographs when the ship passed the Naval Base at Swinemunde. According to the Master, she stated that she could not remember if she had. She explained that she was not interested in Naval ships but just in the country side. The men reportedly repeated the questions several times and then went with [redacted] to the lounge. They told her that she would have to come into the city with them and surrender her camera and films. They also insisted that she would have to surrender not only the films she claimed to have exposed along the Swine and Oder river, but all of the film that she had in her possession. She reportedly stated that they could borrow the camera and films but she would not leave the ship. The men and [redacted] then went to the Master.

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d. Soon after the men left, two other individuals came aboard, dressed in li blue uniforms. They stated that they were Immigrations Officials and that they would like to see the passenger's passports and a copy of the crew list. When the Master informed them that Immigrations Officials had already boarded and departed ship, they indicated that they had no knowledge that anyone from their office, or then themselves, had been assigned to the ship and further that they were the only ones along with the Customs Officials and Health Inspector who were authorized to clear the ship. The Master related [redacted] situation to the Immigrations Officials, who replied that they were not aware of any photography incident. They proceeded with their normal routine and it took three hours instead of the normal one hour or less to clear the ship.

e. [redacted] remained aboard the ship on 7 May. On 8 May, she asked the Master if she could go ashore. He told her that he knew of no reason why she could not since she had not been officially restricted to the ship. While [redacted] was ashore, two men attired as Polish Army Officers came aboard the ship and returned the camera to her brother [redacted] aboard the S.S. MORKACVEGA. At the request of the Polish Army Officers, [redacted] prepared and signed a receipt attesting to the fact that the camera was in good repair. The film was not returned.

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Ser 02798/92E3

26 MAY 1965

f. According to the Master, [REDACTED] experienced no unusual incidents while ashore in Stettin.

g. According to the master, one of the passengers who owned a set of binoculars stated that as the ship sailed past the naval base on 7 May 1965, he had observed several people in the trees on the Eastern bank of the Swina at Swinemunde scanning the S.S. MORMACVEGA with "telescopes".

h. On the morning of 9 May, two police officers came aboard the ship and asked for the passengers' passports. They stated that the passports would have to be taken to police headquarters for "further review". The passports were taken off the ship and returned just prior to sailing time (1130 hours, 9 May).

i. When the S.S. MORMACVEGA got underway, a Polish patrol boat took station directly ahead of the ship. A sailor, with binoculars, who was stationed on the stern of the patrol boat, kept the S.S. MORMACVEGA under constant surveillance while navigating the Oder. At the Zalew Szczecinski, the lake separating the Oder and the Swina rivers, a Polish Navy tug took station directly astern of the S.S. MORMACVEGA. Both the tug and patrol boat escorted the ship until it reached the pilot station north of Swinemunde...

j. The Master also noted that instead of the usual one, two pilots were assigned to the ship when departing. One pilot attended to the navigation of the ship, while the other manned the radio telephone.

k. The Master of the S.S. MORMACVEGA appeared to be more distressed over the fact that it took the ship three hours to clear at Stettin than the possible diplomatic repercussions involved in the alleged taking of photos in denied areas. As a result of the delay experienced by the ship, the Master filed a letter with MOORE-McCORMACK's New York Office to the effect that passengers should be told in advance by the company that photography is not permitted in Soviet Bloc ports.

l. The Master stated, that to his knowledge, no other U.S. Government Agencies have been made cognizant of this incident.

m. [REDACTED] did not return with the ship to New York since she disembarked in Antwerp on 10 May and is presently believed to be in Paris. Her brother, [REDACTED] was interviewed but could not elaborate on any of the information furnished by the Master.

n. A report on the Soviet Naval units sighted at Swinemunde by the Master has been forwarded by DIO-3ND message 212037Z May 1965. Information on Polish port regulations at Stettin will be forwarded by IR 5401009865.

0411

25 May 1965

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] - Identifying Data Regarding

DPOB: [REDACTED]

RES: [REDACTED]

HOME PHONE: [REDACTED]

EMPLOYER: [REDACTED]

PASSPORT No: [REDACTED]

The files of the District Intelligence Office, THIRD Naval District are negative regarding [REDACTED]

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EXEMPTED AT 10 APR 1965
REF AUTO NOTIFICATION
EOD DIR 5300.10

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ENCLOSURE (1)